Equality Bill [Lords] - Standing Committee A

[Janet Anderson in the Chair]

Equality Bill [Lords]

Clause 7 - Scotland: human rights

Meg Munn: I beg to move amendment No. 7, in clause 7, page 3, line 36, leave out ‘body’ and insert ‘person’.

Janet Anderson: With this it will be convenient to take Government amendments Nos. 8 to 11.

Meg Munn: Welcome to the Chair, Mrs. Anderson. It is always a pleasure to see you there.
This is a minor drafting amendment. Clause 7 limits the role of the Commission for Equality and Human Rights in Scotland, allowing the commission to take human rights action on devolved matters only with the consent of a “body” established by an Act of the Scottish Parliament. When the clause was drafted, it was anticipated that that body would be a Scottish human rights commission. However, a Bill introduced in the Scottish Parliament on 7 October will create a Scottish commissioner for human rights. The amendment merely updates the drafting to reflect the fact that the Scottish Parliament will create a post, not a body. It in no way changes the policy set out in the clause.
One effect of clause 7 will be that the Commission for Equality and Human Rights will not be able to institute or intervene in legal proceedings that relate to a matter that falls within the devolved competence of the Scottish Parliament without the proposed Scottish commissioner’s consent. To ensure that that works correctly, we expect there to be a memorandum of understanding between the CEHR and the Scottish commissioner. Where the CEHR obtains the Scottish commissioner’s consent to institute or intervene in proceedings or judicial review on a devolved matter, clause 30(3) will enable the commission to rely on convention rights in the proceedings without having to obtain a separate consent from the Scottish commissioner.

Eleanor Laing: I echo the Minister’s words in welcoming you to the chair, Mrs. Anderson. I am sure that the entire Committee will enjoy working under your chairmanship.
We discussed the effect of devolution this morning. I see why the amendment is necessary. Not as shadow Minister for Women and Equality but in my other capacity as shadow Secretary of State for Scotland, I frequently deal with regulations in Committee that, as a result of consideration of Acts of the Scottish  Parliament, amend primary legislation. Once again, it is good to see that the Government are up to speed with what the Scottish Parliament has done, and the amendments should be made before the Bill becomes law. That makes for much better and neater legislation. I would much rather deal with the amendment now than under a separate statutory instrument in Committee. I support the Government’s amendment.

Amendment agreed to.

Eleanor Laing: I beg to move amendment No. 66, in clause 7, page 3, line 37, at end insert
‘unless the matter is one of a general principle, which applies to the whole of the United Kingdom.’.
Again, we are speaking about humans rights in Scotland. I want to ensure that the Bill is consistent in all that it enables and puts into effect. If we are talking about equality and everyone having the same rights, as indeed they should, matters dealt with in Scotland should be dealt with in the same way as in the rest of the United Kingdom. Conversely, matters dealt with in the rest of the United Kingdom should be dealt with in the same way as they are dealt with in Scotland.
The commission may not have the right to take action in relation to a matter because the Scottish Parliament has legislative competence to enable a body to take such action. The matter could be an issue of principle. Some matters that will arise under the Bill are likely to be issues of principle. The sort of action that we envisage will be class actions where a general matter has gone wrong in discriminatory ways. The matter that might be brought forward for consideration might be used as an example in order that there should be a legal decision to create a precedent, which would then be informative for everyone else who might bring a similar action.
If an issue arose in Scotland, it should still be dealt with in a United Kingdom context if it is a matter of principle that relates to the whole of the UK, as is perfectly likely. We can all envisage that happening. I do not want to see separate bodies of law or separate conventions building out of the Bill that distinguish between Scotland and the rest of the UK, or indeed between Wales and England, or in any other way. If the intent of the Bill is to achieve equality, it should be at every strata. While I have every respect for the Scottish Parliament and all its Acts and enactments, and while there is nothing wrong with the Scottish Parliament having legislative competence where appropriate, it would be quite wrong if clause 7(1) limited the Bill’s ability to achieve what it otherwise might have achieved by restricting what it could do.

Meg Munn: Human rights as a subject are neither reserved nor devolved. As they touch on almost every area of Government, it is necessary instead to consider whether the context in which they are operating is reserved or devolved. It is that split, awkward though it is, that clause 7 seeks to respect. The establishment of both the CEHR and a Scottish commissioner for human rights provides an unparalleled opportunity for the promotion of human rights. However, it is important that nothing gets lost between our  commission and the Scottish commissioner and that the two bodies work together to ensure that they fulfil their respective remits as efficiently as possible.
To that end, clause 9(4) provides that, where it would be advantageous to consider a matter relating to England, Wales and Scotland in one place, the CEHR will be able to do so with the consent of the Scottish commissioner in relation to any devolved matters. That provides a sensible practical mechanism to allow the CEHR to consider devolved human rights issues in Scotland alongside similar issues in England and Wales, while minimising the risk of friction or of confusing differences of approach arising between the CEHR and the Scottish commissioner. We expect that the CEHR will conclude a memorandum of understanding with the Scottish commissioner, to ensure that that arrangement works effectively.
Clause 18 provides the CEHR with a wide power to
“co-operate with persons interested in human rights within the United Kingdom or elsewhere”
in fulfilling its human rights duties. That will, for example, allow the CEHR to work with the proposed Scottish commissioner and the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission on a matter relating to the whole of the United Kingdom. It is important that all the bodies in the UK tasked with promoting the protection of human rights work together effectively, and I am confident that the Bill provides a sensible and effective means of allowing them to do so. I hope that that reassures the hon. Lady and that she is willing to withdraw the amendment.

James Brokenshire: I, too, welcome you to the Chair, Mrs. Anderson. I hear what the Minister has said in connection with devolved powers. She referred to clause 9(4).

Meg Munn: I have had it clarified that there was an error in my brief. It should have referred to clause 7(4). I hope that that helps.

James Brokenshire: I am grateful to the Minister for that clarification, because I could not quite see the relevance of clause 9(4). She has now referred to clause 7(4). In other words, the prior consent of the Scottish commissioner would be needed as regards taking the action described. I suppose that the issue is clarification, which is why the amendment was tabled. There may well be a requirement for general principles to be adopted in terms of common standards on human rights, as my hon. Friend the Member for Epping Forest (Mrs. Laing) highlighted. The issue boils down to whether it is better to construct that by means of a formal concordat between the Scottish commissioner and the CEHR with regard to common ground and common issues and ensuring that we have a clear view and clear standards in relation to human rights and the approach that will be taken.
One issue that the measure obviously touches on is human rights. Without my wishing to pre-empt a debate on clause 9, there is some scope with regard to what is meant by human rights, given that the definition to which we are referring talks about the convention rights and “other human rights”. There may be different views as to what “other human  rights” are in Scotland, as compared with the body of law that might be relevant in the rest of the United Kingdom.
The amendment is designed to prescribe a particular way of dealing with matters to make it clear that, if there are issues of general principle for the whole UK, they should be reserved for the CEHR rather than being devolved. I hope that such a measure would be limited in its use and scope. The emphasis on matters of general principle highlights the approach that we take in tabling the amendment. Because of the uncertainty about the definition of human rights, it seems sensible to prescribe how to deal with issues of principle in respect of which a general approach is required for the whole UK. That is best done by means of a specific requirement rather than by a concordat or an arrangement under which an agreement would have to be reached between the Scottish commissioner and the commission, as stipulated in clause 7(4). It is important to be clear where rights, duties and responsibilities lie. Fundamental issues of general importance should be addressed by the commission, which can take a broad view of their impact on the UK as a whole, rather than, necessarily, by the Scottish commissioner.

Meg Munn: I hope to give more explanation and clarification. It is important to remember that nothing in this Bill can change the devolution settlement. As the hon. Member for Epping Forest, who has a great deal more experience in that area than I do, has said, we have undertaken a great deal of negotiation and looked at much legislation to ensure that that does not happen.
We are trying to ensure that the CEHR and the proposed Scottish commissioner will be able to work together when appropriate. I would not want anything to appear in the Bill that enabled any matter, whether devolved or arising in the rest of Britain, to be undertaken or investigated by the commission without appropriate consultation. It could be that matters of principle relating to devolved matters have wider implications for England and Wales. However, it is appropriate for the Scottish commissioner to consider them and to share the information subsequently.
We believe that the proposed consent mechanism and memorandum of understanding are the right way to achieve that, as we have set out in clause 7(4). Therefore, we wish to proceed that way, rather than allowing a situation to arise in which the commission could do something that affected a devolved matter without having obtained the consent of the Scottish commissioner.

Eleanor Laing: I accept the Minister’s explanation and am pleased to have had the chance to air the argument, because I continue to be concerned that devolution issues should be taken into consideration and that we should have the necessary continuity of effect throughout the whole UK. The Minister has explained the situation very well and has answered the points  made by my hon. Friend the Member for Hornchurch (James Brokenshire). Therefore, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Amendments made: No. 8, in clause 7, page 4, line 6, leave out ‘body’ and insert ‘person’.
No. 9, in clause 7, page 4, line 8, leave out ‘body’ and insert ‘person’.
No. 10, in clause 7, page 4, line 9, leave out ‘body’ and insert ‘person’.
No. 11, in clause 7, page 4, line 10, leave out ‘body’s’ and insert ‘person’s’.—[Meg Munn.]

Question proposed, That the clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill.

Eleanor Laing: On a general point in relation to the way in which the Bill will work in Scotland. I have discovered that the Government have today tabled a motion to be dealt with in the other place, amending the Scotland Act 1998 quite rightly to include the Commission for Equality and Human Rights under the definition of reserved bodies, as opposed to devolved bodies.
My question relates to the timing of the secondary legislation’s introduction in the House of Lords. I do not understand how it can happen today, when the secondary legislation becomes necessary as a consequence of the passage of this Bill. We have not passed this Bill. Since the other place has already dealt with the Bill, it could be that the other place has to deal with the consequential issues arising from its passing of the Bill.
However, the Bill is not an Act of Parliament, it is not law and it is hard to understand how the other place can consider secondary legislation to amend the Scotland Act 1998 as a consequence of the Equality Act, when the Equality Act is not an Act but a Bill.

Meg Munn: I shall make a few general comments about the clause and then respond to the hon. Lady.
Clause 7 limits the role of the Commission for Equality and Human Rights in relation to human rights issues in Scotland in order to ensure a workable division of functions between the commission and the Scottish commissioner for human rights. The Bill to establish the post of the Scottish commissioner is before the Scottish Parliament, and there is no direct reference to the Scottish commissioner, as it does not exist yet. That is perhaps an interesting point, given the hon. Lady’s question.
Under the Scotland Act 1998, human rights as a subject is neither devolved nor reserved; instead, whether a particular human rights issue is devolved or reserved depends upon the nature of the service giving rise to it. We take it as axiomatic that the commission should not create anomalies in the devolution settlement. However, we are aware that there may be occasions when the interface between the two bodies  might be a little untidy. The essential point is that the commission will not normally be able to take action under its human rights duties in a devolved matter without first gaining the consent of the Scottish commissioner.
In relation to the point made by the hon. Lady, my understanding is that once the Bill has received its Second Reading in this place, it is possible for the change that she mentioned to be made. However, I shall obtain greater clarity about that point, and write to her to ensure that we are clear about the situation.
The policy underlying the clause has been discussed with the Scottish Executive and the Scottish Ministers, and it should, we hope, result in good and effective working relationships.

Eleanor Laing: I thank the Minister for her explanation. In retrospect, I am sure that she is right: once the Bill has received its Second Reading, it is in principle likely to become law. Understandably, the other place will have to start enacting secondary legislation as a result of the Bill. We all hope that it becomes law. The secondary legislation that is about to go through the House of Lords seems eminently sensible and, indeed, inevitable. I thank the Minister for that explanation.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 7, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 8 - Equality and diversity

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Meg Munn: The clause sets out the first of the core duties of the new commission. The aim is to ensure that the Commission for Equality and Human Rights is fit for purpose for modern Britain and to provide the commission with flexibility and responsiveness, while making clear its unique duties under the equality enactments. One of the key reasons for establishing the commission was the need to deliver institutional arrangements capable of responding to the challenges of future years. Already, our existing system has reached the limits of what it can achieve. We have three commissions for three areas of equality law: disability, gender and race. However, there is nothing for other areas of equality law: sexual orientation, age—when that is enacted—and religion or belief.
We have a more sophisticated understanding of concepts such as equality and diversity today. By equality, we mean equal treatment or opportunity for two people who can be compared on grounds of, say, race or gender. Diversity, on the other hand, borrows from human rights principles. It recognises the sometimes unique needs of individuals and when fair opportunity or treatment cannot be determined through comparison with another individual. We  believe that both equality and diversity have a legitimate place in the range of duties of the Commission for Equality and Human Rights.
In requiring the new commission to promote equality and diversity, in subsection (1)(a), and to
“encourage good practice in relation to equality and diversity”,
in subsection (1)(b), we have provided it with the scope to address and respond to new or emerging equality or diversity issues. Equality and diversity, in that respect, are not defined with reference to existing discrimination statutes, but can include areas not yet regulated by statute.
The commission is also required to promote equality of opportunity. The duty in subsection (1)(c) reflects the provisions in existing anti-discrimination legislation and particularly the public sector duties. It is not limited to the six equality strands and, together with the equality and diversity elements of the clause, it will enable the commission to encourage good practice in specific areas where legislation does not render practices unlawful. For example, it may promote equal treatment for all, regardless of sexual orientation, in the provision of goods, facilities and services.
Subsection (1)(d) places a duty on the commission to raise awareness and promote understanding of the provisions of the equality enactments and, in particular, of the rights available to individuals under them. In that way, the commission will be able to provide information and advice through a variety of media to individuals and organisations.
Subsection (1)(e) places a duty on the CEHR to use its unique enforcement mechanisms to encourage the equality enactments. Elsewhere in the Bill, we have provided the commission with a more flexible range of powers than are available to the existing commissions in order to enable it to carry out its enforcement duties. The commission is required to work towards eliminating unlawful discrimination, under subsection (1)(f), and unlawful harassment, under subsection (1)(g), as defined in the equality enactments.
Subsection (2) defines terms used in the clause. Of particular note are the definitions of diversity and equality. Diversity means recognising that each individual is different and that specific action may be required to achieve equality. Equality, on the other hand, means recognising that groups of individuals may experience different treatment when compared with other individuals because of particular attributes that they have and that this comparison may define the action necessary to achieve equality.
Subsection (3) provides that the commission may
“promote the favourable treatment of disabled persons.”
That recognises that the Disability Discrimination Act 1995 is alone among our anti-discrimination laws in that it requires action to be taken for disabled people in order to tackle inequality. It requires bodies to make reasonable adjustments. Subsection (4) defines the term “disabled person” for the purposes of part 1 of the Bill by referring to the definition of disability in part 1 of the Disability Discrimination Act.
Taken together, the provisions of the clause set out one of the core duties of the Commission for Equality and Human Rights: to drive efforts to ensure equality and diversity are embedded in the fabric of our workplaces, our economy and our communities.

Eleanor Laing: I thank the Minister for explaining the purpose of the clause. I have some questions that go to the crux of the matter, as the commission’s duties regarding equality and diversity are what the Bill is all about. There are some nuances that might simply be a matter of interpretation, but which might highlight the difference between the Government and the Opposition on the basic purpose of the Bill. Before we give the clause our full support, I want to ensure that any difference is of nuance only, rather than of principle.
Will the Minister give more explanation about subsection (1), particularly in relation to paragraph (b), which provides that:
“The Commission shall, by exercising the powers conferred by this Part ... encourage good practice in relation to equality and diversity”.
What does “encourage good practice” mean? It is rather a vague term, and I do not want the Bill to pass into law in a vague form. We are charged with the duty of passing legislation, and I firmly believe that legislation should never be vague but should be precise, so that it can be interpreted with ease. Encouraging good practice could include a range of activities from running an advertising campaign to going around the country giving talks to relevant bodies or providing education in schools.
The commission is likewise charged, in subsection (1)(a), with promoting
“understanding of the importance of equality and diversity,”
but how can it promote understanding? To what extent is it required to do so? A duty under the law should not be just a vague idea that the commissioners might decide to go along a particular route or take up a particular case and talk about it; it should be much more than that: it should be a positive duty. Therefore, we need to know a little more about what is expected regarding the promotion of understanding.
Subsection (1) also provides that the commission shall
“promote equality of opportunity”.
To what extent is the commission expected to be proactive—I do not like that word; indeed, I do not think it is a real word, but it is probably the right one—rather than passively saying, “Yes, we are in favour of equality”? Is it to be active in promoting equality of opportunity?
There is no doubt that we all want to promote equality of opportunity in principle—I reiterate that we want the Bill to succeed because it promotes equality of opportunity—but to what extent does the commission have a duty to promote equality of opportunity? How much does it have to do? Does it have to publish pamphlets or take an active role? Does it have to put someone on “Richard and Judy” to talk about equality of opportunity? Apparently that is how to get the message over to most people.

Meg Munn: That is a good idea.

Eleanor Laing: It probably is, actually. Perhaps we could interest Richard and Judy in our campaign for equality of opportunity.
How far is the commission expected to go? We must settle these points because it is important to be precise about what it will do. Having said that, the three existing commissions already do a tremendous job of promoting the particular equalities for which they are responsible. The Equal Opportunities Commission, for example, funds meetings and seminars throughout the country, as do similar bodies.

Alison Seabeck: The hon. Lady is talking about general duties and the exact meaning of the clause. Perhaps the Minister can clarify this matter for me because I am new to all this, but clause 13 mentions information and advice and refers to disseminating information, undertaking research and providing education or training. It seems that there is a direct linkage between the hon. Lady’s concerns and what is, at least partially, set out in clause 13.

Eleanor Laing: The hon. Lady is correct to say that some of the questions that I am asking are answered by reference to clause 13. I just want some reassurance from the Minister as to the Government’s intentions. The crux of why I am asking those questions is that I want to know how much it is going to cost. I cannot help noticing that the Minister has piece of paper that reads, in huge letters, which I can read upside down, “Costs”. The Minister rightly anticipates my question, and I will ask it time and again because it is important.
We all want the new commission to succeed, but it is absolutely essential that the amount of taxpayers’ money that goes into the operation of the new CEHR, and all that flows from it, is justifiable. Every penny of taxpayers’ money that is spent on the running of the new commission is a penny not spent on a school or a hospital. We must justify that: the Government must justify it, and the Opposition have to justify why they have not held the Government to account if the spending should not have happened. The current spending level on the three bodies and their work is justifiable, or thereabouts. However, we come back to the massive rise in costs. A 43 per cent. increase is expected when the new arrangements come into force. We all know that if a certain rise in costs is expected, a much greater rise will actually occur.
I consider it an important duty to keep reminding the Minister of the importance of keeping costs down. That does not mean that we do not want the new body to do its job properly; of course we do. However, we must have a clearer interpretation of the duties imposed by clause 8. I would also like to know a little more about clause 8(1)(f) and (g), which require the commission to work towards the elimination of unlawful discrimination and unlawful harassment. By what means will that be done? Is it left intentionally vague so that the commission can formulate a plan? If such a plan is to be formulated by the commission, will it inform the Government what that plan is, or will it have the means, the ability and the power to go ahead  and do the work on its own? I suspect the latter from our previous discussions, and I hope that it is the latter because we have argued that if such a commission is to be set up, it must be independent and not a Government puppet. It must be a creature of the Government and answerable to the Government, but it must be independent so that it can do the work that it is charged to do.
Clause 8(3) states:
“In promoting equality of opportunity between disabled persons and others, the Commission may, in particular, promote the favourable treatment of disabled persons.”
The Minister explained that the Disability Discrimination Act 1995 imposes a duty to discriminate positively on grounds of disability. I understand that and recall it being the intention of the Act, which was passed under a Conservative Government so that it is clearly and by definition a good piece of legislation. We know that it has been effective and that the Disability Rights Commission has been an effective body, but we are now discussing legislation to bring all the strands of possible discrimination together so that they can all be treated equally and given due weight by the new commission, so why is there an exception for disability? Generally, I am not in favour of positive discrimination, quotas or any tokenism in any area of discrimination because that can be demeaning to those whom we intend to help, but I accept that in some areas of disability there is a good reason for positive discrimination and action to help people to overcome a particular disability and to operate on a level playing field with equal opportunity. I would be grateful if the Minister could explain a little further.

Liz Blackman: The hon. Lady has often spoken in the House and been outraged about the small proportion of disabled people who are, for example, in employment or living independently. The statistics on disabled people are an outrage. Will she consider what she is saying in the light of the available data about disabled people, the access that they do not have and the lives that they lead?

Eleanor Laing: The hon. Lady makes a good point with which I do not disagree. I was saying that if someone has a disability, positive discrimination may be necessary to allow that person to operate on a level playing field with people in a similar situation—that is, with equal opportunity. Of course that must be so. I am not saying that it is wrong. That is the law under the 1995 Act, and it has worked well, although not well enough. The hon. Lady is right. We would like to have seen it being much more far reaching and effective in giving disabled people equal opportunity. It has not done as much as we had hoped, but it is still doing that and it will get there. A lot of people are working hard for disabled people in many ways. Much has improved in the past 10 years and the situation is much better than it was. I want to see it get considerably better.
I agree with the Minister’s statistic, which has become my favourite. I am not plagiarising; it was the Minister’s statistic, but, if we repeat it again and again, it will get through to the people who ought to be aware of it. In another context we have discussed women in  the work force working to the limit of their abilities and what would happen if all women who returned to work after having children went back into the work force at the level at which they had previously operated. For example, somebody might be a managing director of a company, stop for a few years to have children and want to go back to the company where she is well known and experienced, but to work only part time because she has to look after children. She might be offered a job as a personal assistant rather than as a managing director, as is often the case. That is the pattern of work for hundreds of thousands of women in Britain today. If instead of taking the lower-paid, lower-status job with lower requirements of her ability, she went back in at the right level and worked to the limit of her ability rather than to a proportion of it, our GDP would be improved by 3 per cent.—equal to our annual trade with Germany.
I make no apology for repeating the Minister’s statistic. It is stunning. It is relevant to clause 8(3) because, if that is the case for women, it is almost certainly the case to at least the same extent, if not a greater one, for disabled people and people from the groups that are potentially discriminated against. It is absolutely imperative that as much should be done as possible. The Minister’s point is correct. We have to do even more to help people who are disabled and could contribute to society—and, let us not be entirely economic, to their own and their families’ lives—far more than they otherwise do. However, although I support the intent of clause 8, I would like the Minister to elaborate a little further. Generally, I have argued that it is absolutely essential that the commission should go ahead and carry out the duties required of it by the clause, not only because that is good for society but because it is an economic imperative, as I have illustrated with the Minister’s statistic.

James Brokenshire: We had a debate this morning on clause 3. The issue of the difference between clause 3 and clause 8 was raised. I should be interested to understand the rationale in terms of consistency. Clause 8(1)(c) refers to the promotion of equality of opportunity. The preceding provision contains a wider reference about participation in society.

Janet Anderson: Order. I think that the Minister dealt with that point this morning. If the hon. Gentleman would like to raise a different point, will he please do so?

James Brokenshire: I am grateful for that clarification, Mrs. Anderson. The only point that I was trying to make on clause 8 relates to the reason for it being constructed in that way. However, I shall be guided by you in relation to how we proceed. I shall move swiftly on, lest I incur your ire, which, as a new Member of Parliament, I do not wish to do.
Clause 8(1)(e) refers to the enforcement of the equality enactments. I should like to highlight the issue of the concept of the word “enforce”. I appreciate that the clause is the overarching guide to which the subsequent provisions of this part of the Bill relate.  However, the word “enforce” has a strong connotation. Many of the references to the equality enactments themselves relate to private individuals wanting to enforce their rights. I appreciate that there are provisions that follow on from this clause relating to support to individuals, through legal advice or other support, to enable them to enforce the relevant equality enactments. However, the choice of the word “enforce” is strong in this context. Are we seeking to create something similar to the Crown Prosecution Service—the equalities prosecution service, or whatever? I am sure that that is not the intention, and that the clause seeks to provide the backdrop to which the subsequent provisions of this part relate, but I would be grateful for clarification on that subsection.
There are references here to the elimination of unlawful discrimination and unlawful harassment. Those references relate to a number of provisions that are referred to in clause 33, including the Employment Equality (Religion or Belief) Regulations 2003. I have briefly examined them and in essence they contain some provisions to deal with religious harassment. I appreciate that this may cut across some of the subsequent provisions of part 2, but can the Minister give any guidance on the term “unlawful harassment” and the extent to which there is any crossover between part 2 and the regulations to which I have referred?
I echo the comments of my hon. Friend the Member for Epping Forest on clause 8(3) on the favourable treatment of disabled persons. We are trying through this Bill to provide equality of opportunity, and I understand the significant problems that people with disabilities will find in trying to get work.
I entirely echo the comments of the hon. Member for Erewash (Liz Blackman), who highlighted the statistics and the current inequalities that the Disability Discrimination Act seeks in part to deal with, for example, by providing facilities and other rights for disabled people to be able to participate in society and to have equality of opportunity. However, I am concerned, to echo the comments of my hon. Friend, to see that this clause is trying to go for fixed quotas or something similar. I would appreciate the Minister’s response to those points.

Meg Munn: Let me again set the context of the development of the proposals about the commission, because it is important to understand how we got to where we got to, and the processes that we went through. As Members will be aware, there are three existing commissions, and some of the powers and duties being taken forward already existed for them. They will be taken forward in a more unified and modern way.
The hon. Member for Epping Forest asked about encouraging good practice. It is clear from the relevant sections of the Race Relations Act 1976 and the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 that in the 1970s we did not encourage good practice—or if we did, we did not put such things in legislation. However, that has changed, and the Disability Rights Commission Act 1999 contains a specific reference to that:
“with a view to encouraging good practice in the treatment of disabled persons”.
Therefore, we are developing our views and our understanding on this matter. There is a recognition that commissions can and should gather information about actions that result in the outcomes that they were set up to achieve—in these instances, equality of opportunity between men and women, and equality of opportunity for disabled people— and it is important that such information is shared.
The Race Relations Act includes a statement about promoting equality of opportunity and good relations; we will address that shortly. The Sex Discrimination Act contains statements about promoting equality of opportunity between men and women generally, and promoting equality of opportunity in employment. The existing work by the current commissions will be taken forward.
The consultation period that followed the publication of the White Paper “Fairness for All: A New Commission for Equality and Human Rights” was marked by a lengthy debate about what should be the balance between the new commission’s enforcement and promotional functions. Business and public bodies—those organisations with responsibilities to comply with discrimination law—were understandably encouraged by the promotional activities provided for in the clause. On the other hand, equality organisations, including the commissions, were anxious to ensure that their unique role to enforce and encourage enforcement of equality legislation should be properly reflected in the CEHR’s duties. The clause takes careful note of the conflicting concerns, in reflection of our belief that the CEHR should have a wide range of powers and activities available to it, to ensure that it can be proportionate and take necessary action in a flexible way.
What exactly do we mean by that, and how are we going to pay for it? The hon. Lady has seen my bit of paper with “Costs” written on the top of it. As she gave me due notice that she would want to raise that subject on several occasions, I wanted to make sure that I had the necessary information to hand. In our overall calculation of the likely costs, we included sufficient money for promotion, media campaigns and the public sector duty, about which I will say a little more, but not too much more as it arises later in the Bill—as a not quite so new Member, I would not want to incur your ire, Mrs. Anderson. Fostering community cohesion and advice and information are also provided for in that calculation of the costs.
What might we see? Public bodies might seek the commission’s advice about duties on disability and race—and, if we subsequently deal with it, gender. They might also seek advice in other areas—for example, in employment, in terms of sexual orientation or age, as that comes on stream.
The hon. Member for Hornchurch raised the issue of harassment. We know that we will have a debate in a different context on part 2. I want to clarify the position as it relates to this part of the Bill. Harassment and discrimination are unlawful if they contravene any of the equality enactments, including part 2 of the Bill  and the Employment Equality (Religion or Belief) Regulations 2003. There is no real crossover, as part 2 deals with goods, facilities and services and the latter with employment. I hope that that reassures Opposition Members.
In terms of enforcement, the commission is required to uphold and enforce existing discrimination law. Opposition Members have asked whether the way in which the clause highlights people with disabilities means there is special treatment. This is about taking forward the situation that was addressed in the Disability Discrimination Act 1995, which recognises that equality of outcome is not achieved by equality of treatment. There can at times be a need to make so-called “reasonable adjustments” to ensure that disabled people can have access to employment and to a range of other things in the same way as people without a specific disability. I hope that I have been able to reassure hon. Members.

Evan Harris: I am grateful to the Minister for the answers that she has just given. They make a lot of sense and we are all grateful for that elucidation. Will she just clarify how the provision that we are discussing, which I support, is different from the provision of a positive duty elsewhere in the Bill to promote a lack of discrimination and equal treatment between men and women? In particular, I am thinking of the provision, which I again support, for affirmative action to be taken in relation to the treatment of women. Should that, on balance, perhaps be referred to here in a similar, although not identical, way to the reference to disabled persons?

Meg Munn: I am not quite sure that I followed the hon. Gentleman’s detailed point. Perhaps he could come back on it or we could return to it later.

Evan Harris: May I have another go? The Minister has explained why there appears to be differential regard under clause 8(3), which is the proposed statute for disabled persons. It reflects the law, which allows for favourable treatment, in terms of reasonable adjustments, of disabled persons and therefore has a specific reference to the duties on equality and diversity. Where there is a positive duty—more than just a duty of non-discrimination—to promote equality, as there is in the race strand and there is shortly to be in the gender strand, is there a need to reflect that? Alternatively, does she feel that it is already covered under clause 8(1)?

Meg Munn: If I am answering the question that the hon. Gentleman is putting, that is covered under clause 8(1). This comes back to the fact that the fundamental premise of the race relations and sex discrimination Acts is that people should be treated equally. The fundamental principle in the Disability Discrimination Act is that we needed a different approach and that is why things are set out differently. If that is still not clear, perhaps we could return to it later or the hon. Gentleman and I could enter into some helpful correspondence.

Eleanor Laing: I want to take up the point made by the hon. Member for Oxford, West and Abingdon (Dr. Harris). I was trying to follow through his reasoning in a logical progression. I might not have understood perfectly what he was saying, but I think that he was asking whether, if there is to be a positive discrimination for disabled people, should there not also be a positive discrimination for women. If there were then positive discrimination for other groups or communities, the logical end result would be that there was so much positive discrimination we would altogether lose sight of the fact that we were trying to achieve equality.

Evan Harris: Will the hon. Lady give way to allow me to regret opening up this can of worms? The point I was trying to make, which I shall not go into any further, is that there is already a positive duty in respect of race; I agree with the Minister that it is covered by clause 8(1). The point that I think the hon. Lady was elucidating is that particularly in regard to disabled persons, subsection (1) is not enough to cover the need for favourable treatment—for example, reasonable adjustment, going the extra mile if that is the right term—to be provided.
I was just agreeing with the hon. Lady’s explanation. I did not wish to raise a completely new area of discussion.

Eleanor Laing: In that case I will close the can of worms. We were better where we were before.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 8 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 9 - Human rights

Sandra Gidley: I beg to move amendment No. 70, in clause 9, page 5, line 4, at end insert—
‘(1A)In promoting the awareness, understanding and protection of human rights, the Commission shall assess whether, and to what extent, adequate advice and assistance is available to individuals who are or may become party to proceedings under section 7(1)(b) of the Human Rights Act 1998 (c. 42) (proceedings)’.
I, too, welcome you to this sitting, Ms Anderson.
This is a probing amendment. It attempts to obtain clarification and assurances that the Commission for Equality and Human Rights will be expected to follow the recommendations of the Joint Committee on Human Rights on monitoring access to case support for individual action under the Human Rights Act 1998. Concerns have been expressed that individuals may find it more difficult under the Bill to obtain the funding to pursue a case. There is a lack of clarity about what the Legal Services Commission will fund. There are also anxieties that people who may previously have qualified for support or assistance will fall through gaps, and the support will no longer be available.
The Bill was amended in the other place to give the Commission for Equality and Human Rights the power to bring about judicial review proceedings against a public authority that acts in a manner that is not compatible with the rights of the convention. It provided a strategic power which would be a useful tool for challenging and ending routine abuses of human rights. That is particularly important in respect of disability because, as the previous clause acknowledges, it is a problem. We often have to go the extra mile to ensure equality of opportunity and access for disabled people, whose needs are sometimes complex. Another problem with disability is that the DRC’s power to provide individual case support was never activated and there are worries that the group will continue to be disfranchised.
It is also important that the CEHR’s role in promoting human rights standards in the delivery of public services is supported and encouraged. Active promotion and awareness of good standards will, in the long run, probably decrease the need for legal advice and support in certain cases. It is not clear whether the CEHR will be expected to signpost or refer individuals whose rights appear to have been infringed. It is not clear either how the system would work and who people would be referred to. Rather than a lack of clarity, it may simply be complex. The Minister may recall that she and I served on the Committee that considered the Adoption and Children Act 2002; a flowchart was created to explain the particularly complex matters dealt with in that legislation. I hope that the Equality Bill is not that complex and that the Minister will be able to describe the situation, but there seems to be a lack of understanding among those who will be lobbying the commission.
The Joint Committee On Human Rights has expressed concern that the powers of the Commission for Equality and Human Rights to assist people under the Human Rights Act 1998 might be restricted. The matter needs to be kept under review. If the Minister feels that adequate provision has already been made, will she promise a review to monitor how it is working in practice? Or does she have other means of allaying some of the fears that have been expressed?

Eleanor Laing: We achieved considerable agreement in our discussions this morning, and we have moved forward this afternoon in a pleasantly convivial way and with general agreement. Almost all amendments have been accepted or happily withdrawn, and no one has vehemently disagreed—until now.
Amendment No. 70 is totally unacceptable to the Conservative party. If ever a blank cheque created a charter for lawyers, that would be it. [Interruption.] The hon. Lady may laugh, but the next time she is looking for the Government to spend money on something other than what will effectively be the funding of legal aid—when she next looks for spending on schools or hospitals in her constituency, or more doctors or a kidney machine—she should remember how much money she proposes being spent in pursuance of the amendment.

Sandra Gidley: The hon. Lady seems to be under the great misapprehension that spending on equality will somehow mean problems with hospitals or educational institutions. Does she not accept that if we can spend small sums of money to ensure that case law is right, there will be less discrimination and that older people in particular may have greater access to health services?

Eleanor Laing: Yes, I accept that. However, the hon. Lady said small amounts of money. I accept that spending small amounts of money in the right place is strategically correct. I emphasise again, lest there be any misunderstanding, that I am not against the large amount of money being spent in furtherance of the Bill’s aims. I am in favour of that, but I am absolutely and resolutely against a charter that would encourage more funding of more cases. We are already a sufficiently litigious society—far more so that we used to be. People talk about rights, but they do not consider duties. If someone trips over a paving stone, they do not say, “Oh, goodness, I should have looked where I was going.” They immediately try to find legal aid in order to sue whoever they think has the most money among those responsible for the paving. I used to work in that area, and I understand it well.

Evan Harris: Will the hon. Lady say whether she is opposed to people being able to bring cases under the Human Rights Act 1998 for abuse or loss of their human rights, or whether she feels that it should be privately funded and available only to those who are able to afford it? Is she opposed to litigation under human rights legislation, or does she think that it should not be publicly funded and that only those with the resources should be able to do so?

Eleanor Laing: Of course not; that would be a ludicrous position to take. I understand why the hon. Gentleman asks the question; he wants me to say that I believe that only those who have enough money to fund litigation
I understand why the hon. Gentleman asked the question; he wants me to say that I believe that only people who have enough money to fund litigation should ever be able to bring a case. I emphatically do not believe that. I do not, however, want money, which should be used positively to further the commission’s work in addressing the six strands of potential discrimination, to be used in the way that the Liberal Democrats have suggested, which is to obtain more public funding to pursue a particular case. The floodgates will open if it becomes too easy for taxpayers’ money to be used for such litigation.

Sandra Gidley: The hon. Lady has deliberately misinterpreted what I said. The amendment seeks greater clarification of what the new commission could do and what the Legal Services Commission could fund. I gather that the LSC will take up some of the responsibilities. There needs to be clear understanding of, and agreement about, who will pick up what. Surely the hon. Lady accepts that, in a small number of cases, people will not qualify for legal aid but that it is in the greater public interest that the case be brought.

Eleanor Laing: In that case, it would be quite proper for the commission to bring a case and to fund it if it identifies it as a test case that explores new legal territory and that should be tested in the courts. That is the only way in which to make progress in establishing the law, and I am completely in favour of it. I am not, however, in favour of more public money being spent not necessarily on spurious cases, because of course the LSC would not grant the money to fight spurious cases, but on cases that do not need to be brought to court, on cases in which an awful lot of money is spent on legal bills, and on going to court instead of spending the money properly in the exercise of the commission’s positive duties.
I am very concerned that the Liberal Democrats are pushing at the boundaries of how much public money is to be spent in this area. I reiterate my concern that the costs of this whole enterprise will rise and rise, and that the commission will be discredited in a few years if it turns out that it is spending too much public money for very little return.
If, on the other hand, members of the Committee, who are the legislators of this legislation, draw very careful lines now, thus ensuring that the taxpayers’ money that will be spent furthering the aims of the Bill is carefully and tactically spent in the right way so that it produces the right results for a minimum amount of money, the new commission will garner more and more respect. If the commission and its work garner more and more respect, so will the aims of the Bill. My concern is that the whole purpose of the commission and its standing in our society will be undermined if that does not happen, and if we allow a vague duty or right to spend taxpayers’ money to further these very good and very worthy aims so that money is spent unnecessarily and can be criticised, as it will in certain parts of the media.
I do not want that to happen. I want the commission to work. It will work only if it has respect, and it will have respect only if it spends public money—taxpayers’ money—wisely and accountably.

Evan Harris: I was not going to speak to this amendment because the case for it has been put appropriately and effectively by my hon. Friend the Member for Romsey (Sandra Gidley), but I wanted to respond to the points made by the hon. Member for Epping Forest. I have a great deal of respect for the hon. Lady, personally and regarding her work in scrutiny, but it is important to examine the wording of the amendment.
Amendment No. 70 does not call for more spending on litigation by the commission but asks that
“In promoting the awareness, understanding and protection of human rights, the Commission shall assess”—
I assume that that means doing research and writing a report, which will not cost millions of pounds—
“whether, and to what extent, adequate advice and assistance is available to individuals who are or may become party to proceedings”
in human rights litigation. That is not an unreasonable thing for a commission on equality and human rights to do because it is a question of access to human rights and whether certain people, such as the poor or disabled, have equality of opportunity in accessing their rights in the courts.
If we have a Human Rights Act, it is only right as a consequence that people should be able to take action under it; those should not be ridiculous actions, but actions where there is a reasonable case. As far as I know, the hon. Lady’s party did not object to what I, despite having voted against legislation to ban hunting, considered to be a ridiculous action brought by the Countryside Alliance under the Human Rights Act to seek to overturn that ban. As I say, I voted against the ban, but once Parliament had made a decision I did not think that such an action was a worthwhile use of anyone’s money, even though it did not rely on public funding.

Eleanor Laing: For the sake of clarification, the hon. Gentleman is entitled to his opinion on the issue, but that is not a parallel because the Countryside Alliance did not spend taxpayers’ money.

Evan Harris: But it has resources, which is the point I am keen to put across to the hon. Lady. She said in response to an earlier intervention that we cannot deny people access to justice simply because they are poor. However, every time she says she does not want public money spent, or would like less of it spent, on securing publicly funded litigation where there is an option for it—even if that point applies to those with resources as well—she is effectively supporting the denial of justice to the less well-off.
One of the big issues in relation to the Human Rights Act is whether people have enough access to have recourse to its provisions. We know from analyses and research—I commend to the hon. Lady the work of academics in Cardiff in this respect—that the majority of actions under the Act have been taken by middle-class people concerned about, for example, light pollution and planning matters. That is their entitlement, but researchers say that the people whose human rights are not respected regularly are often the socially isolated and the poor, which is why the issue of public funding and adequate access to advice and assistance is critical if our human rights framework is to work.
The amendment would give the commission a power or duty to report on whether it thinks that people are getting fair access to whatever funding is available. It may be that the hon. Lady wants a smaller cake made available for that than I want, which is a reasonable argument to have, but it is a question of fair access and whether the funding available is not going to the people who need it.
I urge the Minister to consider the amendment in the spirit in which we tabled it. My hon. Friend the Member for Romsey quoted the view of the Joint Committee on Human Rights, on which I have the privilege of serving during this Session; I was not party to the views it expressed before. I shall not repeat her quote, but the Committee expressed concern that since  the commission would not be allowed to help people to proceed with human rights cases, the least it could do was ensure that those people got help from somewhere on a fair basis. I hope that the Minister will take the amendment, so well spoken to by my hon. Friend, in the spirit in which it is meant and not be distracted by the funding issues, which are important but not directly relevant to the amendment.

Meg Munn: I agree that access to justice is very important, particularly in human rights cases. That is why the Lord Chancellor’s direction to the Legal Services Commission on funding priorities includes human rights proceedings as a category of case that should be given higher priority.
We decided at the outset that it would be unwise to create a separate source of funding for such cases in the Commission for Equality and Human Rights; if we did, it would not only cause confusion and duplication, but risk overwhelming the commission with the task of sifting through the vast range of cases to which human rights might relate. In its 16th report of the previous Session, the Joint Committee on Human Rights recognised the wisdom of that approach. It said that the provision of legal assistance in human rights cases would be a fruitful topic for an inquiry by the commission once it had been established.
It is already within the commission’s powers to conduct such an inquiry. If the commission agrees with the JCHR’s recommendation and conducts such an inquiry, we would certainly be interested to consider its recommendations; but it is quite something else to require the commission to undertake such work as part of its duties. The commission’s strategic planning process needs to take account of the competing priorities for its resources—a point well made by the hon. Member for Epping Forest—and it would not be right for us to impose such work on the commission before it has even been established. As hon. Members may know, we amended the Bill in another place to increase the commission’s freedom of movement. To constrain it again in such a way would be a retrograde step.
A memorandum of understanding between the CEHR and the Legal Services Commission would be a matter for the two bodies. As I said, we have established the CEHR’s funding remit so that it does not create unnecessary overlap with the Legal Services Commission, but it may nevertheless be useful for the two organisations to discuss—and, if necessary, align—their strategic priorities. However, that is not something that we wish to force on the CEHR.

Evan Harris: The Minister raised the issue of a memorandum of understanding between the CEHR and the Legal Services Commission. That, she will be aware, was a recommendation of the JCHR in its 11th report of 2003-04 on the plans for a new commission. Does she think that such a memorandum would, at least, be a welcome development? Or is she simply saying that it is not even a matter for the Government to give an opinion on, and that it is a subject only for the bodies themselves? Without a memorandum—so  says the JCHR—it is hard to see how we can be certain that there will be alignment between the CEHR’s strategic approach and the Legal Services Commission’s approach to funding.

Meg Munn: I am indeed saying that the matter is up to the two bodies. Members of Parliament want to ensure that the new commission is independent, but also that it does what we want it to do. There has always been that tension. I am indeed saying that the issue is a matter for the two bodies, but I have already suggested that it could be useful for them to look at their strategic priorities and perhaps align them. However, I do not wish to say that we would specify what they should do.
Obviously, there are restrictions on the availability of legal aid, and I am sure that hon. Members will recognise the need to concentrate resources on cases in which the need is greatest. For that reason, the Legal Services Commission assesses each case individually, on the means of the applicant and the merits of the case, against its standard criteria.
This has been a useful discussion, because it is on a subject of concern and interest. I hope that the hon. Member for Romsey is content with the response to her inquiries, and that she will withdraw the amendment.

Sandra Gidley: I still think that there is probably a lack of clarity about how the system will work in the long term. In fact, the Joint Committee on Human Rights said that
“the matter may need to be revisited if the Commission’s experience in practice shows that individuals with bona fide claims under the Human Rights Act are discriminated against in relation to their ability to access the courts in comparison with individuals bringing claims under equality legislation. We would expect the Commission to keep this matter under review.”
Clearly, it would be helpful if there was a ministerial commitment on that, but as there seems to be little support for the amendment in other quarters, I beg to ask leave to withdraw it.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Evan Harris: I want to raise something that will come as no surprise to the Minister: the absence of a provision for a role for the commission to deal with the UK’s obligations under international human rights treaties. I should think she was expecting that.
It is worth while mentioning a recommendation in paragraph 15 of the JCHR’s 16th report of the 2004-05 Session. It was reporting on the previous Bill, but the current Bill has not changed in that respect. The Joint Committee regrets:
“No express duty or power to participate in the UK’s reporting processes in relation to international human rights treaties is conferred on the Commission by the Bill. The Commission is to have a general duty to monitor progress towards the achievement of the clause 3 aim”
but, the Committee goes on:
“We think that a role for the Commission in the treaty reporting processes should be an important part of its activities, and would have the benefit for the Commission itself in integrating its human rights and equalities agendas. It would also be in accordance with the UN’s Paris Principles relating to the status of national human rights institutions.”
The relevant part of the Paris principles is probably, although not exclusively, 3(b), which states that the principles should serve
“To promote and ensure the harmonization of national legislation, regulations and practices with the international human rights instruments to which the State is a party, and their effective implementation”.
It continues, in paragraph (c), saying that they are
“To encourage ratification of the above-mentioned instruments or accession to those instruments, and to ensure their implementation”.
It goes further than that, as well.
That is an important part of the role of a national institution. No doubt, this country argues for institutions to have adequate independence and powers to protect human rights and promote them in other countries that we do not think do as good a job. Although I accept that there is nothing in the Bill to prevent the commission from doing that, particularly since it is in a different shape from last time, it is regrettable that it is not specifically mentioned.
The Minister may respond with the same argument that she used before—that she does not want to tie things down to expenditure, but in relation to what she said on the previous amendment that is an argument of last resort, because if we as a Parliament think that something should be done, we should ensure that it is do-able and, if necessary, done. To argue that doing so might use up funding that should be used for something else is the Government essentially saying that there is not a high enough priority for it to be specified. That may be a difference of opinion between two politicians, but I would be grateful if the Minister said how far she expects the role to be taken in the Bill and whether she believes that enough is being done in this respect.
We have a convention on trafficking, which the UK has still not ratified, or indeed signed, despite that being a priority for its EU presidency. There is, therefore, a need for pressure to be put on politicians and both Houses to ensure that we meet our international obligations, especially when we require or request other countries to do so. We could set up our commission and our human rights institutions as a model for other countries to look at, particularly if we get right the role of institutions in respect of our conduct under international treaty obligations.
I urge the Minister to respond to that concern.

Eleanor Laing: It is becoming clear that, although I do not vehemently disagree with the Minister about much in the Bill—there is the odd point here and there—I disagree vehemently with the Liberal Democrats on a great many issues. I am worried about clause 9.
Sandra Gidleyindicated dissent.

Eleanor Laing: The hon. Lady may raise her eyebrows, but that is what we are here for. If we all agreed, people would not elect us. The purpose of a Parliament is to set out different points of view. The point of scrutinising a Bill is that different arguments can be expressed so that the best legislation can result from that exercise or at least the legislation for which the majority in the country has voted. [Interruption.] The hon. Member for Oxford, West and Abingdon was right to say sotto voce that the majority of people in this country did not vote for the party that is in government. However, now is not an appropriate time to discuss that as I shall be called to order. Having called myself to order, I shall stop talking about such matters.
I am not worried about the true aim of clause 9, which is to promote human rights. It is correct to
“promote understanding of the importance of human rights”.
That is motherhood and apple pie; it is the whole point of the Bill. I have never understood what is so good about apple pie, but motherhood is okay—as, of course, are human rights. The clause will increase litigation and, thus, its cost. I do not mean only in terms of legal aid. I am talking not only about the budget of the Legal Services Commission or any other public body that grants funds to bring a case to court, but about the administrative costs of the courts and the backlog of cases. The court system is becoming overloaded because we are more litigious. I am worried about all of those issues, not just the public funding of cases brought by people who cannot afford to bring a case to court on their own.
I am also worried that the current law can be distorted by arguments about human rights. For the sake of time, I shall not go into that now. Although it is correct to
“promote understanding of the importance of human rights”
and to
“encourage good practice in relation to human rights”,
it is not right to encourage and promote more cases under human rights law or, indeed, under the law that will be created by the Bill. The courts will become more clogged with unnecessary litigation. As I said in relation to the previous matter, if the commission believes that it is necessary to bring a particular case to court to test the law, of course that is right. I am not objecting to such action. However, if we let things go too far, the commission and its work will be undermined. It will not command the respect that it ought to deserve.
Under subsection (2), human rights means
“the Convention rights within the meaning given by section 1 of the Human Rights Act 1998”.
That is understandable. Under the clause, human rights also means “other human rights”. What other human rights does the Minister envisage? I can tell by her expression that she has an answer to that, and I look forward to hearing it.
It seems to me that the Human Rights Act 1998 was drafted very broadly and that the range of human rights referred to under that Act is very wide. Once again, I am thinking about costs—not only the costs of funding cases, but the costs of the courts. I am also  concerned about the great burden that encouraging more litigation puts on the court system—it will delay the system and bring the administration of the law into disrepute. I do not want to see that happen.
I said on clause 8, and I say again on clause 9, that I want to see the commission succeed and I want to see the Bill succeed in its aims. To do that, the legislation must command respect, and to command respect it must not be seen to be going too far. I will use the phrase that I was criticised for using on Second Reading—I have not yet used it in Committee. If clause 9 is seen to be a charter to promote political correctness, it will undermine the whole purpose of the commission and the Bill, and I do not want to see that happen.

James Brokenshire: I want to raise a small point in relation to subsection (2)(b), which my hon. Friend has just highlighted with reference to other human rights. The hon. Member for Oxford, West and Abingdon has emphasised the need for greater clarity in the provisions, by indicating that he would take the commission in all sorts of different directions, which people might or might not agree with. It is interesting to contrast the approach that is taken to defining human rights in this context with the very precise definition that has been adopted in relation to the equality enactments, in legislation defined as the equality enactments is specifically listed, and the Secretary of State is given the flexibility to add to, vary or change that list by means of an order.
I therefore ask the Minister to consider whether that would be an appropriate way to proceed on this clause, given that there is a need for certainty. Given that the commission will have an overarching responsibility for so many different things, there is a risk that it may be taken in the various directions that the hon. Member for Oxford, West and Abingdon might like, but it might thereby lose the focus that it rightly needs. Will the Minister consider adopting the approach taken in clause 33, by being quite specific as to the human rights legislation that is intended to be covered by this clause, and by providing for it to be updated, changed or varied, if necessary, by means of an order?

Meg Munn: Since there has been such a wide-ranging discussion, I hope that hon. Members will permit me to set out the general position on the clause before I deal with the specific questions asked by Opposition Members.
The Human Rights Act 1998 is among the most important constitutional legislation that any Government have introduced since the achievement of universal suffrage. The notion that all human beings should be treated with respect, equality and fairness is now enshrined in our law. That framework of fundamental rights not only protects vulnerable members of our society, but promotes a new culture of public service delivery based on respect for the rights of individuals.
The Act was, however, only the start of the process, and clause 9 is the next stage. Through its duties based on promotion and encouragement, the new commission will, for the first time, provide  independent institutional support for human rights. Moreover, as we mentioned earlier today, not only will the commission have specific duties in relation to human rights, but its wider work will be underpinned by the human rights principles.
Colleagues of all parties have recognised the merit in that approach. In its report of March 2003, the JCHR emphasised the need for more active promotion of the Human Rights Act for the benefit of integrated promotion of human rights and equality. As the Committee further wrote in its 16th report at the end of the last Parliament,
“the intention to create the CEHR represents the most important milestone reached so far in establishing the institutional support which is needed to achieve wider implementation of the Human Rights Act and respect for human rights, particularly within public authorities.”
The commission will not generally undertake independent enforcement of human rights. I hope that that will reassure the hon. Member for Epping Forest that the human rights functions are largely promotional—except for the strategic power to seek judicial review, which is reflected in the duties—so we do not imagine that clause 9 will increase litigation. The Human Rights Act already allows the convention rights to be enforced through the courts. However, the commission will be able to rely on the convention rights in legal proceedings for judicial review that it institutes or in which it intervenes.

Evan Harris: I am not sure why the Minister should seek particularly to reassure the hon. Member for Epping Forest, but I am happy to remain ignorant of that. However, she asserts that clause 9 should not increase litigation, because it is intended only to
“promote awareness, understanding and protection of human rights”.
If she is counting on that, she is probably wrong, whether we like it or not. If more people know what their rights are under the Human Rights Act, and if there are good cases that need to be brought to secure those rights, then promoting awareness and understanding of them and their protection might well involve dealing with injustice and overturning the denial of human rights. Even the hon. Member for Epping Forest would probably agree that that was a good thing. I hope that she will not live in expectation of the figures showing that that sort of promotion is unsuccessful.

Meg Munn: The hon. Gentleman should consider both sides of the coin. By promoting greater awareness of human rights, we hope to experience fewer infringements of human rights. I made it clear that the functions are largely, not solely, promotional.
The commission will be able to rely on the convention rights in the proceedings for judicial review. That will allow it to bring cases to clarify the law, perhaps as the result of an inquiry or to challenge systemic infringements of human rights. As there will still have to be a victim or potential victim of any alleged unlawful act that the commission challenges, that will not create new opportunities for litigation,  but will allow litigation to be conducted more efficiently. The notion of human rights extends beyond the convention rights within the meaning of the Human Rights Act. The United Kingdom is party to a number of international treaties and conventions that give rise to human rights, such as those concerning children and discrimination against women. [Interruption.] When we speak of human rights and “other human rights”, we include other international conventions to which the UK is party, including the convention on the elimination of all forms of discrimination against women, the universal declaration of human rights, the international covenant on civil and political rights and the convention on the rights of the child.
To answer the hon. Gentleman’s question about why we have set it out in this way in the Bill, I have to return to the problem of lists, and the need to continually update them or add things that have been missed out. The commission might wish to take into account many treaties, of varying scope and importance, and it would be very hard—as well as undesirable—to list them.
Many countries in all parts of the world have already established commissions to support human rights. The United Nations recognises a lot of those bodies as national human rights institutions. The Government believe that the Commission for Equality and Human Rights will meet the requirements of the Paris principles so that it, too, will receive that accreditation. That is not a meaningless label. The status will place the commission within the international human rights regime and will underline the UK’s commitment to human rights.
On the hon. Gentleman’s aside on human trafficking, only eight of 25 European countries have so far signed the European convention, which the UK Government hope to sign shortly. There is no deadline for signing it. Indeed, human trafficking has been a priority of the UK presidency, and a great deal has already been done in this country.
 The CEHR will have a real effect in promoting a culture of respect for the rights of individuals and will use human rights as the fundamental underpinning of its work on equality and diversity. I hope that by briefly running through the provisions of the clause, I will clarify issues that hon. Members have raised.
Subsection (1) lays out the duties of the commission in respect of human rights. They include duties to promote the awareness, understanding and protection of human rights, to encourage good practice and to encourage public authorities’ compliance with their duty under section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998. Subsection (2) defines human rights as the convention rights within the meaning of the 1998 Act and other human rights, which I have already listed. Subsection (3) requires the commission to give priority to convention rights.
I referred earlier to the need for human rights principles to underpin all the commission’s work. Subsections (4) and (5) say that in fulfilling its other duties under clauses 8 and 10, the commission is  required to take into account relevant human rights, whether convention rights or otherwise. Furthermore, a matter may be included within the meaning of “human rights”, even if it is a matter to which the other duties may also relate. For example, even though equality and diversity are covered by the clause 8 duties, the convention on the elimination of all forms of discrimination against women may be included in the commission’s human rights work as well.
We will come on to clause 18 later, so I refer to it now only in its relationship to this clause. Clause 18 allows the commission to co-operate with other bodies, either in the UK or elsewhere, in carrying out its human rights duties under clause 9.
I hope that that reassures hon. Members on how the clause will operate. It is an important clause and is essential to building through the commission a greater understanding and awareness of human rights in this country.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 9 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 10 - Groups

Vera Baird: I beg to move amendment No. 50, in clause 10, page 5, line 35, at end insert
‘or a demonstrable commitment to maintaining a transgender identity for a significant period of time,’.
This probing amendment is an attempt to interest my hon. Friend the Minister in the prospect of developing a broader definition of a transgendered person. Clause 10, which deals with groups, refers in subsection (2) to
“a group or class of persons who share a common attribute”
in respect of any of the strands of discrimination that are listed. A transgendered person is defined as some who has
“proposed, commenced or completed reassignment of gender”.
My amendment would add that a transgendered person is someone who has shown
“a demonstrable commitment to maintaining a transgender identity for a significant period of time”.
The point is about inclusivity in the category. By maintaining a transgender lifestyle, people who have not undergone reassignment are, none the less, as likely to be identified as in the transgender class as a person who has gone through the process or is approaching it, as the definition is wide enough to include somebody who is commencing on it or proposing to commence on it. Persons who are not yet in that situation are capable of suffering the same kind of discrimination, as they will be perceived as members of that group. Consequently, their rights ought to be properly protected. The element of the original definition in subsection (2)(d), which is about a person who has “proposed ... reassignment of gender”, will cover part of this mischief, but there will be people who have not got that close to the process who are living a  settled life in a transgendered way. As I say, they are likely to need the employment protection that we are keen to give to this sector.
I have thought of an analogy, although I do not know whether it works; I shall wait to be criticised deeply the minute I sit down. If I intend to live my life as a Christian, and I do, I expect to be protected in that status, whether or not I have been baptised or confirmed into the Church, because I live my life in that way. If that is anything like an analogy, we come quickly to the mischief at which I am aiming. By linking the definition totally to the physical process of gender reassignment, the subsection is perhaps too arbitrary and exclusive. I am inviting my hon. Friend the Minister to consider whether the definition could be widened.

Eleanor Laing: Although I support entirely the intention behind clause 10, and particularly the paragraph that the hon. and learned Member for Redcar (Vera Baird) seeks to amend, I am extremely concerned that her amendment is too vague. She said that it was a probing amendment. Given that she is a learned lady, I am sure that she is also a good draftsman, and I shall therefore not criticise the exact words of her amendment. However, what is a “demonstrable commitment”? It is hard to understand what that is, if not a
“proposed, commenced or completed reassignment of gender”.
A “proposed ... reassignment of gender” is quite wide, because the person does not need to have taken any steps whatever, but needs merely to have stated, or proposed, an intention for reassignment of gender. However,
“a demonstrable commitment to maintaining a transgender identity for a significant period of time”
is much too vague; “significant period of time” is much too vague. Surely if somebody is to complete reassignment of gender, it will not be for a “significant period of time”, but for ever. I therefore oppose the amendment No. 50 as too vague and imprecise.
Having said that, I am pleased that there is a specific duty under subsection (2) not only on age, disability, gender, race, religion or belief and sexual orientation, but—properly—to people who are undergoing or wish to undergo a reassignment of gender. Earlier this year in Blackpool, I met a group of people who represented the lesbian, gay and transgendered community. I was very impressed by their arguments in favour of the Bill. Before I met them, I had thought that the transgender provision was possibly a fringe issue for a tiny minority and not desperately important. However, I completely changed my mind. People who undergo a reassignment of gender take an enormously brave step in their lives, usually because something does not fit in their personality. There is usually a good biological reason—something that medical science did not recognise properly until recently. That means that generations of people have lived incomplete lives, or lived their lives in some way out of kilter with themselves. It is a terrible thing for society to put a person through that experience, by deciding that nothing can be done to change the description as either male or female that was given to them at birth. Many  people have benefited from being able to change their gender, not out of some frivolous desire to do so, but out of real biological and psychological necessity.
It is excellent that the Bill contains specific provisions to protect those people. The Government still need to go some way—in pensions legislation, for example, and in relation to marriage and divorce rights—but I fear that the Bill does not provide the right forum for that discussion. I merely mention that the subject should be examined elsewhere and that the rights of transgendered people should be brought into line with those of everyone else. However, although I respect the fact that the hon. and learned Member for Redcar has the best of intentions, my hon. Friends and I cannot support her amendment, because it is too vague.

Meg Munn: I thank my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Redcar for raising this important issue. I am sure that many Committee members will have received correspondence from constituents about this matter and related matters. I should say at the outset that I support the intention behind the amendment, but it is not necessary.
The new Commission for Equality and Human Rights has a duty to promote, very broadly, an understanding of the importance of equality and diversity. Clause 10 makes it clear that the commission should work towards the elimination of prejudice against certain groups, as well as enabling them to participate in society. The amendment would widen the definition listed in clause 10(2) to include all people who are transgendered. It would introduce a different definition from the one used elsewhere in the Bill and in other legislation—namely “transsexual”.
Transgender implies a wider range of identities, including transvestites, those who express an alternative gender role only occasionally, intersex people—those born with an ambiguous biological sex—and those who express themselves as neither male nor female. Transsexuals—people with an overwhelming need to undergo transition and to live permanently in the resulting role—are protected against discrimination under the Sex Discrimination Act 1975. It is that definition that is used in the Bill.
The amendment would cause confusion, and we want to avoid any reduction in clarity and certainty in the application of the law. However, I am sympathetic to the claim that so precise a definition as that in clause 10, based on the Sex Discrimination Act 1975, could be over-restrictive for the purpose of the Commission’s work in promoting good relations, eliminating prejudice and encouraging participation in society.
For clarity, although clause 10 singles out groups based on the categories of people who are entitled to protection against discrimination, consistently with the general law on discrimination, it does not limit the commission’s wider duties under part 1, which include the duty generally to promote understanding of the importance of equality, diversity and human rights between all people and groups of people.
Clause 8, which sets out the commission’s equality and diversity duties, would provide the right statutory locus to enable the commission to work with and provide equality for the group in question and other groups that are not defined by discrimination law. In that sense, transgendered people are within the new commission’s remit, including its work to encourage good practice and promote understanding of the importance of equality and diversity. Under its wide equality and diversity duties, the commission could also promote good relations between transgendered people in other groups and between transgendered people and wider society and work towards eliminating prejudice, hatred and hostility towards them. The commission could also encourage transgendered people to participate in society as part of its duty to encourage good practice in relation to equality and diversity. I hope that I have made the position clear and that my hon. and learned Friend will consider withdrawing her amendment.

Vera Baird: I am grateful to my hon. Friend. I must tell the hon. Member for Epping Forest that I did not draft the amendment myself, although I do not think that it would have been better if I had. I consider
“a demonstrable commitment to maintaining the transgender identity”
to mean that every time that someone is seen over a measurable period, they are behaving in that way and are clearly embarked upon a lifestyle of a transgendered nature. I did not think that it needed to be more strictly defined than that. The point is for it to be inclusive, rather than exclusive.
Someone who has not yet taken a decision to undergo reassignment of gender—there is a quite long lead-in time while the person simply lives that way to ensure that they want to go through with gender reassignment—is likely to be discriminated against because they will be identified as part of that group in any event. However, I found what my hon. Friend said very reassuring. It is clear that the clause is intended to be as inclusive as possible. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn

Vera Baird: I beg to move amendment No. 34, in clause 10, page 5, line 44, leave out subsection (4) and insert—
‘(4)In determining what action to take in pursuance of this section, the Commission shall have due regard to the importance of exercising the powers conferred by this Part in relation to all the groups defined in subsection (2).’.

Janet Anderson: With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment No. 37, in clause 10, page 5, line 45, leave out from ‘have’ to the end of line 2 on page 6 and insert
‘due regard to the importance of exercising the powers conferred by this Part in relation to all the groups defined in subsection (2).’.

Vera Baird: This will be a brief, condensed contribution. I want to probe again the issue in subsection (4) by seeking to replace it with an amended subsection that gives different priorities. That is  because the Under-Secretary of State for Work and Pensions, my hon. Friend the Member for Stirling (Mrs. McGuire), who responded to the debate on Second Reading, did not have an opportunity to make a fuller response to the points that I am about to make again briefly now.
The purpose of clause 10 is to promote understanding of the importance of good relations among groups and to encourage good practice about relations among groups. Those groups are defined as sharing the common attribute as to any of the strands—that is groups defined by age, race, religion and so on. That is excellent, but subsection (4) provides that in determining what action to take in pursuance of that power to promote understanding among all the groups, the commission has to have particular regard to the importance of exercising its power in relation to groups defined by reference to race and religion or beliefs. That clearly, in this part of the Bill at any rate, gives pre-eminence to the need to address the interests of groups defined by race, religion or belief above all the others.
The first thing that happens when confronted with that is that the duty to give pre-eminence or priority is inevitably reflected in the resources that are allocated to the various sectors. This morning the hon. Member for Romsey talked about the poorer pay of people at the Equal Opportunities Commission. It has always functioned on about half of the budget of the CRE, which I never found entirely explicable. It does not seem to be a good idea to set up a new united commission in which people from every strand are expected to have faith and confidence and at the same time to set a priority that will inevitably knock on to the resources applied to that sector to the exclusion of age, disability, gender and all the others.
If my hon. Friend can give me some reassurance that the priority in subsection (4) will not resonate in resource allocation within the commission, I shall be very pleased. I do not know, however, how she can provide that reassurance.
Before I turn to the main thrust of my argument about subsection (4), I acknowledge that the Women’s National Commission, which represents more than 400 grass-roots women’s groups, and the Fawcett Society drew to my attention the clause’s potential impact.
I accept that race and religion or belief are hugely important sectors as a result of the potential that exists for interracial and inter-religious conflict. At present, there is perhaps a particular political priority in those two areas. People are made very unhappy, are harassed or are killed because of racial and religious difficulties.
Similarly, however, people are killed because of their gender. More than 120 women a year are killed by men. One in two women has been stalked, has been raped or has suffered violence at home. Some 23 per cent. of people with learning disabilities have suffered physical abuse and 48 per cent. of gays in the east end of London have suffered from homophobic crime. Groups other than vulnerable racial and religious groups face threat, danger, injury and harassment.
All the examples that I have given of injuries to certain groups are inflicted by other groups. Violence against women is inflicted largely by men and violence against gays is inflicted largely by heterosexual people. It seems odd that those groups will be given a lower priority than those who suffer from similar conduct because of their race or religion. I do not understand why, because there is currently a political imperative to deal with race and religion—which I accept and respect entirely—those things will be prioritised in the Bill, which is, in a way, the constitution for the commission, for ever. If we fix these priorities today, they remain fixed for the commission’s lifetime.
Elsewhere in the Bill, the commission is required to set its priorities in consultation with the community. In subsection (4), that duty is being undermined by priorities being immovably fixed.

Evan Harris: I agree with everything that the hon. and learned Lady has said. I just want to endorse what she has said about the immutability of the hierarchy that is being established. Enough distress and disappointment has already been created by introducing protections against discrimination that included only religion. Protections against sexual orientation were not included initially. I hope, and firmly believe, that a single equality Bill and the outcome of the equality review and the discrimination law review will sort out the problem.
I strongly support the hon. and learned Lady when she says that clause 10, as it stands, in what is effectively the commission’s constitution, retains those hierarchies long after everyone has as equal rights in law as possible.

Vera Baird: I thank the hon. Gentleman for that point. On Second Reading, my hon. Friend the Member for Wallasey (Angela Eagle) said that the Bill was a taster of equality. She said that the main course, which would rectify all hierarchical positions in the equality strands, would be the single equality Act. Generally speaking, that is correct. Unfortunately, here we see that the starter is entrenching hierarchies in equality at the outset.
I do not have to rehearse any factual situations to make this point, but there is sometimes conflict between equality strands. Unfortunately, to prefer race and religion or belief over gender or the rights of the gay community could undermine the confidence that other sectors might have in the Bill.
I ask my hon. Friend the Minister to look again at the purpose of the clause. My amendment simply proposes that, in determining what action the commission should take under its duty to promote good relations among groups, it should have equal regard to all the communities that it will protect.

Sandra Gidley: The amendment tabled in my name and that of my hon. Friend the Member for Oxford, West and Abingdon is almost identical to that tabled by the hon. and learned Member for Redcar. She has already made many of the comments that I was going to make, so I do not intend to rehearse them.
The crux of the matter seems to be the independence of the commission. Clause 4 provides that the commission should set its own priorities, and there is a particular flaw in appearing to make a special exception for race, religion or belief. We are effectively tying the hands of the commission before it starts, and that is not the way in which we should want to proceed.
I fully understand the political motives behind the provision, because with some of the tensions in societies it may be felt to be a laudable way to proceed. Having said that, I think that the commission would probably come to the same conclusion as us. The decision should be left to the commission, because it needs to be seen to be independent.
The problem is that there are conflicts, as well as synergies, between strands. To create a hierarchy in which one strand appears to be given greater attention is a dangerous road to go down. In a populist example, on a Saturday I occasionally get to watch “Casualty”. A current storyline involves a racist group of young men who initially target a particular community. In another episode, the same group is involved in a homophobic crime. The group is clearly operating within the same community.
If the clause were really concerned with tackling problems within communities and groups, it would accept that a community consists not only of a group of people of a certain race. I should like to think of a community as a mixture of people with all inequalities interspersed. It seems odd that any action should consider one side of the problem but not the other.
Some communities have a large gay population, and there are an increasing number of communities for the over-65s. If we stick to the provision in the Bill, those groups could be further disfranchised. We cannot ignore the fact that within some communities, there could be problems related to sexual orientation.
I, too, read the briefing from the Women’s National Commission and the Fawcett Society. They are particularly concerned about women. In closing, I shall quote from that briefing:
“Women from all backgrounds, and indeed other groups, cannot have confidence in this new body if its legal base is biased against them. The gap between resources allocated to women and other groups is already extensive and women do not expect this to be institutionalised nor written into statute.”
It is disappointing that in a well meant Bill, a well intentioned clause falls at the first hurdle because it already disadvantages a large number of those people whom, if it were worded differently, it would seek to help.

Eleanor Laing: I entirely agree with what the hon. and learned Member for Redcar and the hon. Member for Romsey have said, so I shall not repeat the arguments. If either amendment were put to the vote, we would support it. It is hard to understand why there should be pre-eminence in this respect for race, religion or belief, but not for the other five strands that we are discussing in the Bill.

Meg Munn: I thank my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Redcar for her thoughtful remarks about her concerns. I am also grateful for the contributions from Opposition Members. The amendment is designed to change clause 10(4), which requires the commission to have particular regard to the importance of exercising its clause 10 duties in relation to groups defined by race, religion or belief. Those duties include promoting good relations and the understanding of the importance of good relations between groups in society, working towards eliminating prejudice and hate, and encouraging participation in society.
I would like to reassure my hon. and learned Friend that the intended effect of clause 10(4) is not to set out a statutory hierarchy of the various equality groups. The ethos of the new commission is that it will work for the benefit of all in society. By bringing together all the equality groups and issues in one body, we are equipping the commission with the power to deal with issues relating to individuals who belong to more than one group or who experience discrimination on more than one front.
There is also much to be learned by sharing experiences, strategies and approaches that have until now been confined to separate commissions working on specific areas of discrimination. We do not want to undermine the benefits of that approach.
It might help the Committee if I explain a little of the rationale for clause 10(4). The Government made it clear at the outset of the process that there would be no going back on the powers available to the existing commissions. In many ways, the success of the new commission will depend on its ability to build on the very important work carried out by its predecessor bodies. That will be enormously important in establishing its credibility.
The Commission for Racial Equality is alone among the existing equality commissions in having a duty to promote good relations among people of different racial groups. In addition, the amendment to the Race Relations Act in 2000 required public authorities to have regard to the need to promote good relations between different racial groups. On both counts, there is no question but that the new commission will need to carry forward the legacy of the CRE and work with public authorities to help them to meet their obligations under the race equality duty.
The CRE has, since its inception, supported a strong network of locally based racial equality councils and other organisations delivering on local race equality work. They have performed a crucial role in raising awareness of the rights and remedies available to individuals who experience discrimination, especially among racial and ethnic minority faith communities. In building on the existing work as we move to the new commission, we have guaranteed support for local race equality work for the foreseeable future; indeed, we did so as far back as the White Paper in 2004. Clause 10(4) goes some way towards giving effect to that commitment.

Sandra Gidley: Given that the CRE will not come fully on board in the new commission until a couple of years after it is established, is there not a case for continuing that good work but for giving the commission an opportunity to replicate the useful work done in the race field by other bodies and even allowing the commission to decide which strands of equality it might wish to do extra work on?

Meg Munn: I refer the hon. Lady to the clause, which sets out the responsibility in relation to all the different groups. I am emphasising that, as regards the work of the new body and its credibility, it must take forward the range of responsibilities, powers and duties that apply to the existing commissions. The duty that we are currently discussing is a particular one and is of enormous import in the work that the CRE has done. The Government believe that work to be of enormous import, and it will therefore be carried forward into the new commission.
Although it is correct that the CRE will not join the new commission until around 18 months after it starts if all goes to plan, we are setting up a body that needs to be inclusive from the outset. I caution against putting race issues to one side. We are creating a commission that will take account of all issues that are raised in relation to the six areas and, as the hon. Member for Romsey said, is underpinned by human rights. Some close, joint working will be needed to ensure that race issues are in at the start of the commission and are not neglected.
I was about to say that I caution against interpreting that as a statutory guarantee that the commission’s work on faith and race issues will always be prioritised over anything else. That is simply not so. The commission’s good relations work will, of course, benefit many groups. It will have new powers that are not available to the existing commissions to take action to prevent or reduce crime, prejudice or hatred directed at specific groups. For example, it would be well positioned to address issues of violence against women in black or minority ethnic communities.
A further safeguard is that the commission has a duty to consult all stakeholders when drawing up its strategic plan and to involve a wide range of interests when setting its priorities. The recently published Women’s National Commission analysis of the Government’s initiatives concerning violence against women, to which my hon. and learned Friend referred, is an important contribution to the wider debate and  sets out some of the evidence base that I am sure the commission will work from. Clearly, much more needs to be done to tackle this important issue effectively, and we anticipate that the new commission will play a major role.

Evan Harris: Why is the provision not restricted to race and why is it necessary to expand it to religion or belief, which would cover Christians, Muslims, atheists, agnostics and people who have no religious belief? I understand that there is a particular problem with racism, but I do not believe that beyond Islamophobia, which is racist, there is a particular reason to link all those other groups as communities or groups with ethnic minorities, who certainly face significant challenges.

Meg Munn: I disagree. There is certainly a clear belief that there are concerns about issues in relation to people’s religions.
I believe that we have found the right balance between acknowledging the historical legacy of the commission’s good relations work and the need to ensure that the concerns of all its interest groups are heard and addressed. I hope that I have been able to reassure my hon. and learned Friend and that she will withdraw her amendment.

Vera Baird: I am grateful to my hon. Friend. I understand as well as any Member with some ethnic minority constituents the problems facing people from racial minorities and ethnic minorities with a faith component, which is obviously what the provision is directed at, although I heard what the hon. Member for Oxford, West and Abingdon said. I pay tribute to the Commission for Racial Equality and emphasise the importance of its legacy being carried forward powerfully. It is clear that neither my amendment nor the two organisations that back up the proposal intend to put race or religion on one side—quite the reverse. It is a hugely important sector, but it is difficult to understand why it is the most important sector and will be for ever in the Bill. The matter is slightly shrouded in incomprehension but I trust my hon. Friend, and I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. Clause 10 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Further consideration adjourned.—[Mr. Dhanda.]

Adjourned accordingly at twenty minutes to Seven o’clock till Thursday 1 December at five minutes to Nine o’clock.